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Preface1 
This paper is written in connection to the research project on «Regulation, Control and 
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Rokkan Centre. The project is funded by the Norwegian Research Council. Earlier 
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organization in Leuven, May 2–3 2003 and at the seminar on organizational forms, 
autonomy and control in the public sector in Bergen, December 1–2 2003. We wish to 
than the participants at the seminars for valuable comments. 
                                                 
1 Paper prepared for seminar on organizational forms, autonomy and control in the public sector , Bergen, 1–2 
December 2003. 
  4
Summary 
This paper describes and analyses the development of the Norwegian state apparatus in 
the post World War II period based on a broad institutional perspective and a 
comprehensive database. The Norwegian reform context is presented by focusing on 
the main components of the administrative policy that different governments have 
pursued, and the main organizational forms in the Norwegian state is described. The 
empirical data is presented by focusing on changes in formal organizations over time: 
the size of the state apparatus, and horizontal and vertical specialization. A main 
empirical finding is that there has been an increasing parallel process of vertical 
specialization and horizontal de-specialization in the Norwegian state over the past 20 
years. 
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet beskriver og analyserer utviklingen i den formelle organisasjonsstrukturen 
i den norske stat i tiden etter den andre verdenskrig, basert på et bredt institusjonelt 
perspektiv og en omfattende databank om strukturelle endringer i norske statlige 
virksomheter i perioden 1947–2003. Den norske reformkonteksten blir presenteret ved 
å fokusere på hovedkomponentene til de ulike regjeringers  forvaltningspolitikken i 
denne perioden. Det gjøres videre rede for de viktigste formelle organisasjonsformene i 
staten. Det empiriske datamaterialet blir presentert ved å fokusere på endringer i formell 
organisering over tid, på endringer i størrelsen på statsapparatet og på horisontal og 
vertikal spesialisering. Et hovedfunn er at det i løpet av de siste 20 årene har vært en 
økende tendens til en parallell utvikling i retning av sterkere vertikal spesialisering 
samtidig som det har foregått en sterkere horisontal de-spesialisering. Dette innebærer at 
virksomheter har blitt fristilt ved at de har blitt flyttet fra tilknytningsformer som ligger 
nær politisk ledelse til tilknytningsformer som ligger på større avstand samtidig som 
enheter på samme forvaltningsnivå slås sammen til større enheter. 
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Introduction 
When discussing the reorganization of public sector organizations it is important to 
distinguish between reform and change. By reform we mean the active and conscious 
attempt to change the organizational structures, procedures or personnel in 
administration. Based on this definition, we can imagine situations where reforms do 
not result in changes, or situations where changes occur that are not the result of 
reforms (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). In this paper we are concentrating mainly on 
structural changes and ask to what degree the changes can be understood as a result of 
an active administrative policy, or if we have to take other considerations into account 
to understand the changes. 
The state apparatus is a multi-functional system, where different units may not 
merely maximize a simple set of goals but are required to compromise between partly 
conflicting objectives and values. Ambiguous and inconsistent goals are inherent 
characteristics of the public sector, which political and administrative leaders have to 
find ways to live with, rather than a sign of disease that needs to be cured. This implies 
that political and administrative leaders are permanently confronted by tensions and 
dilemmas to which there is no simple solution (Lægreid and Roness 1999). Changing the 
organizational form of state organizations may challenge and change the balance 
between different values and tasks, like political control and professional or corporate 
autonomy. 
The structural development of the state administration can be described along a 
combination of a vertical and a horizontal dimension (Egeberg 1989, Christensen and 
Egeberg 1997, Lægreid and Roness 1998). By vertical specialization we mean 
differentiation of responsibility on hierarchical levels, describing how political and 
administrative tasks and authority are allocated between forms of affiliation. Vertical 
specialization can take the form of structural devolution, autonomization or 
agencification, meaning transfer of responsibility from units close to the political 
leadership to units that are further away from the political executives. Vertical de-
specialization implies movement in the opposite direction by moving responsibilities 
closer to the political leadership. By horizontal specialization we mean splitting of 
organizations at the same administrative level, for example splitting a ministry (or an 
agency) into several ministries (or agencies). Horizontal specialization focuses on how 
tasks and authorities are allocated between organizations at the same hierarchical level, 
WORKING PAPER  21  –  2003 THE  STRUCTURAL  ANATOMY OF  THE  NORWEGIAN  STATE   
 8
for example between ministerial areas (Christensen and Peters 1999). Horizontal de-
specialization implies merging of organizations at the same administrative level.2   
As shown in Figure 1 there can be quite complex change processes going on in 
individual reform cases, involving both horizontal and vertical specialization or de-
specialization. As we will show later, the most common form of change in the 
Norwegian state apparatus since 1947 is horizontal de-specialization without changes on 
the vertical dimension. Less common, especially in the last decades, is vertical de-
specialization. In this paper we will handle the vertical and the horizontal dimension 
separately, and not dig into the complexity of combining them. 
Figure 1. Horizontal and vertical specialization and de-specialization 
 HORIZONTAL 
SPECIALIZATION 
Recoupling/no change HORIZONTAL DE-
SPECIALIZATION 
VERTICAL 
SPECIALIZATION 
Example: Splitting the 
integrated organization 
Norwegian Railways into a 
company (NSB), a 
regulatory agency and a 
directorate 
Example: 
Transforming the 
Norwegian 
Broadcasting 
Corporation from a 
public administration 
body into a state-
owned company  
Example: Establishing 
the central agency for 
health and social 
services by moving 
tasks from ministry 
and merging agencies 
Recoupling/no change 
 
Example: Splitting the 
Ministry of Social Services 
and Health into two 
ministries 
Stability/internal 
changes 
Example: Merging of 
colleges 
VERTICAL DE-
SPECIALIZATION 
 Example: Integrating 
the Headquarter of 
Defence and the 
Ministry of Defence 
 
 
The paper describes and analyses the development of the Norwegian state apparatus in 
the post World War II period. Three questions are topical:   
 
1. What are the changes in the size and anatomy of the state apparatus in this 
period?  
2. What is the degree of horizontal and vertical specialization in the state apparatus 
in this period? 
                                                 
2  In addition, we can distinguish between intra-organizational and inter-organizational changes in structural 
arrangements (Egeberg 1989, Christensen and Egeberg 1997). By this we mean if the specialization occurs within 
or between organizations in the state administration. Intra-organizational changes are changes within distinct 
organizations such as a ministry, an agency or a state-owned company. In this paper we will mainly focus on inter-
organizational changes. 
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3. How can we explain the changes that have occurred in the structural 
arrangements? To what extent are they results of an active administrative policy, 
and to what extent are they constrained by internal administrative culture and 
tradition or by external contexts, situations and the dominating international 
doctrines of different periods? 
 
We will first outline the database and the method used. Second, we will present our 
theoretical approach, which is a broad institutional perspective. Third, we will present 
the Norwegian reform context by focusing on the main components of the 
administrative policy that different governments have pursued. Fourth, we describe the 
formal structural arrangements in the Norwegian state by focusing on the main 
organizational forms. Fifth, we will present our empirical data in two sections focusing 
on changes in formal organizations over time: the size of the state apparatus, and 
horizontal and vertical specialization. The paper ends by discussing the coupling 
between administrative policy and changes in structural arrangements and concludes by 
pointing out the main findings. 
Data and method 
The empirical basis for the paper is a review of existing studies of structural devolution 
reforms and administrative policy in the Norwegian state apparatus, and a 
comprehensive Norwegian State Administration Database (NSA) covering changes in 
the formal structure of the Norwegian ministries, civil service, state-owned companies 
and governmental foundations from 1947 onwards. An organization is included in the 
database if it meets one of the four following criteria: 
 
a) It is a ministry or subunit within ministries, like divisions, sections or offices. 
b) It has a legal status as part of the state, separate from, but subordinated the 
parent ministry or parliament. These organizations are labelled civil service. 
c) It is state-owned or partly (i.e. majority) state-owned. These are labelled state-
owned companies (SOCs). 
d) If a self-owned organisations is founded by ministry or central agencies. These 
are labelled governmental foundations. 
 
Within the single group of state organizations there are some further sub-categories. For 
the organizations that are included in the NSA, changes in organizational structure from 
birth to death are recorded. A predefined categorization that handles organisational 
change in three main categories is used: changes related to the founding of an 
organisation, changes related to the maintenance of an organisation, and changes related 
to the ending of an organization. For each main category of changes there are several 
sub-categories, like secession, dividing, merger, absorption and movement of 
organizations vertically and horizontally within the state apparatus and out of it. 
As of 2003, the database covers a total of about 2.850 unique organizations, 
including 1.700 internal units within the ministries. These 2.850 unique organisations 
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have been through about 8.600 organizational events, indicating that there are 
substantial turbulence and structural changes of different kind going on in the state 
apparatus.3 
Theoretical approach 
The discussion will primarily be based on a broad institutional perspective. An 
institutional perspective implies that, over time, organizations will develop an 
‘institutional profile’, comprised of those roles, rules, regulations, routines, traditions, 
standard organizational forms and procedures which are the common features of 
institutions. We expect that these characteristics will provide constraints on how the 
organizations react to external pressure form the environment as well as to politically 
motivated reform initiatives. Thus, in order to understand reforms and changes in the 
administrative system, we will be concerned with the relations between the reform 
programmes, institutional constraints and societal changes. An institutional perspective 
would question that changes in organizational structure are a prompt and necessary 
response to changing demands from the environment as well as being an immediate and 
straightforward response to political signals (Olsen 1992, Lægreid and Roness 1998). 
The chances for planned design are restricted, though not to such a degree that the 
political actors are rendered powerless. 
Like other organizations, the state organizations may have institutional 
characteristics, including specific identities and capabilities (March and Olsen 1995, 
Roness 2001a). Some of the identities and capabilities are expressed through elements of 
specialization and hierarchy within and between organizations. At any given time, the 
historical legacy of an organization is ingrained in structural features that will delimit or 
open up for specific actions and outcomes. Structural change means new forms and 
degrees of specialization and hierarchy within and between organizations, implying 
changing identities and capabilities. Specialization is primarily related to the handling of 
certain policy areas or tasks in separate parts of the organization, in central government 
by the various ministries and agencies and in the state-owned companies and 
government foundations between different types of companies and foundations.  
To understand the diversity of the structural devolution processes and their effects 
and implications we will use a transformative perspective that focuses on the complex 
and dynamic interplay between instrumental reform efforts, national structural and 
cultural contexts, organization-specific characteristics and external environmental 
pressures (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a, Olsen 1992).  
                                                 
3  For a more detailed description of the database see Rolland and Ågotnes (2003), and for a discussion of the 
problems of categorizing state organizations, see Roness (2003). 
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The national context identified by the transformative perspective concerns first the 
formal aspect of the political–administrative system and its implications for the 
instrumental reorganization of state organizations (Campbell and Halligan 1992, 
Christensen and Peters 1999). Norway has for several decades had minority 
governments, and over the past decade an increasingly active parliament. The degree of 
political or administrative control over state organizations versus professional and 
commercial autonomy is related to how this vertical relationship is formally organized. 
This means that the traditionally strong political control of government bodies in a 
country like Norway, within a system of ministerial governance, goes hand in hand with 
a hierarchical and integrated model. From an instrumental perspective we will, first, 
expect a tight coupling between administrative policy programmes and structural 
changes in the state apparatus. The goals, values and suggested solutions that are 
enhanced in the central policy programmes will affect the changes in the different 
structural arrangements. Second, we will expect changes over time in organizational 
forms in accordance with the suggested reforms in the policy programmes. 
The national context also concerns the historical and cultural traditions of political–
administrative systems (March and Olsen 1989, Selznick 1957). Informal norms and 
values develop over time, are manifest in a distinct administrative culture and serve to 
further stability and integration. The point of departure in this approach is that a certain 
style of controlling government agencies and state-owned companies has developed 
over the years, ranging from countries that have tended to see state-owned companies 
as a strong and integrated instrument of political development, to countries where 
leeway and autonomy for SOCs and their loose coupling to political actors or goals have 
been taken for granted (Grønlie 1998). The crucial question in a period of reform and 
transition is whether traditional norms and values associated with SOCs match the 
norms and values of the modern reforms (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). Clearly, a lack of 
compatibility may prevent or modify the reforms, while compatibility may reinforce 
them. Administrative reforms are more easily accepted if they are in accordance with the 
administrative culture. From a cultural point of view we will, first, expect less variation 
in structural arrangements over time. The adaptation process will be gradual, 
incremental and slow. Second, since there may also be some organization-specific 
cultures, we will expect variation in structural arrangements between ministerial areas. 
Internal rules, traditions and routines will be different from one sector to another, and 
path dependencies will constrain how the formal organizations change in practice. The 
internal forces for change, robustness and stability will be more important than shifting 
policy signals, and the coupling between the general policy doctrines and actual changes 
will be rather loose. 
A third set of factors describes the changes of formal structural arrangements as a 
response to external pressure (Olsen 1992). This environmental determinism can be of 
two kinds. In the first instance, a country may adopt internationally based norms and 
beliefs about how a public business should be organized and run simply because these 
have become the prevailing doctrine. New Public Management (NPM), with its strong 
focus on structural devolution, has its origins in certain Anglo-Saxon countries and 
international organizations, like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), where a kind of reform myth has taken hold, becoming 
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ideologically dominant and diffused all over the world (Czarniawska and Sevón 1996, 
Sahlin-Andersson 2001). This diffusion process may imply isomorphic elements – i.e. it 
may create pressure for similar reforms and structural changes in many countries (cf. 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Administrative policy rhetorics may reflect international 
trends and ‘fads’. The looser the association between formulations in reform 
programmes on the reform content and the structural changes in practice, the more the 
reform may be interpreted from a symbolic perspective. The ideas of institutional 
environment will predict variation in actual organizations over time. What the dominant 
doctrine of the day is will vary over time, and what is regarded as appropriate and 
modern organizational forms will influence the actual changes. There is a 
decontextualization process going on that will lead to small differences between 
ministerial areas. 
In the second instance, structural devolution may be adopted to solve widespread 
problems created by a lack of instrumental performance, by technological change or by 
economic competition and market pressure in a globalized economy. In this case, 
reforms of state-owned companies are adopted not because of their ideological 
hegemony but because of their technical efficiency. The absence in Norway of national 
fiscal pressure and the accumulation of a huge governmental petroleum fund may 
reduce this kind of external pressure for devolution. On the other hand, the external 
constraints coming form increased integration into the Europe through the agreement 
of the European Economic Area (EEA) that came into force in 1994, might lead to 
isomorphism between the Norwegian structural arrangements and the EU doctrines. 
The EU policy towards market competition and deregulation are at the heart of New 
Public Management. The EU puts normative pressure on the domestic administration, 
and also more directly demands certain ways of organizing and controlling state 
apparatus to secure competition in the internal market, like the establishment of 
autonomous control and regulatory agencies (Bleiklie, Lægreid and Wik 2003, 
Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2003). 
We will argue that public reform processes and their effects on organizational 
structures are not characterized by a simple adjustment to current international admini-
strative doctrines, but must be understood from a transformative perspective. Taken 
together, the environmental, cultural and structural contexts constitute transformative 
preconditions and constraints that in a complex and dynamic way define the leeway 
political and administrative leaders have in responding to global reform ideas and to 
specific reform initiatives (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a). Cultural factors can modify 
the effects of administrative policy programmes on the reorganization of state 
organizations. But cultural factors can also support the structural devolution, making the 
effects even stronger. In the same way, external pressure exerted by new administrative 
doctrines might be enhanced or tempered by domestic political strategies or by an 
administrative culture or tradition. The transformative perspective adds complexity to 
our understanding of administrative reform processes and makes the story less elegant 
but probably more realistic. 
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The Norwegian reform context – 
administrative arguments and 
doctrines 
Administrative reforms are not new phenomena in the development of the Norwegian 
state. What is new, however, is that starting in the early 1980s, the field of 
administration emerged as an independent policy area with its own vocabulary and 
institutions, in which reform initiatives were taken up through comprehensive and 
universal reform programmes. The central administrative policy documents include the 
modernization programme of the Willoch government (1986), the renewal programme 
of the Brundtland government (1987), the report from the Hermansen commission on a 
better organized state (1989), the Jagland government’s «The Norwegian House» (1996), 
the programme on a «Simplified Norway» of the Bondevik I government (1999), the 
Stoltenberg government programme for innovation of the public sector in Norway 
(2000), and the programme of the Bondevik II government labelled «From words to 
action» (2002).  
The Norwegian administrative system is a complex body combining partly 
conflicting principles, values and mixtures of different control devices. Most of the basic 
values and considerations in administrative policy have been present through the post-
Second World War period, but the individual components and the emphasis attached to 
each have changed over time (Lægreid and Rolland 1994). During the first decades after 
1945, a form of problem solving was undertaken through the establishment of new 
administrative units or reorganization of old units (Lægreid and Roness 1983). As soon 
as problems in society had been accepted as the responsibility of public sector, a 
permanent administrative body was established for furthering routine problem solving 
in that policy area. The result is a state apparatus that can be characterized as a coral 
reef, comprised of layer upon layer of organizations established at various points in 
time, without any collective overall plan. As we shall see, however, the permanence of 
these organizations is not as high as the coral reef metaphor indicates. They are more or 
less permanently under reorganization through splitting, merger and movement 
vertically and horizontally in the state apparatus.  
There appears to be a cyclical process, whereby development in one direction results 
in a counter-process and sometimes the re-emergence of new values and controls in 
another. In the 1950s and 1960s, considerable importance was attached to constitutional 
law and collective standards for appropriateness and justice. The rule of law, hierarchical 
structure, formal control and traditional bureaucratic procedural methods of 
administrative control was underlined. The Parliamentary Ombudsman for public 
administration was established in 1962, and a Public Administration Act came in 1967.  
A main question in the Norwegian administrative history from the mid-19th century 
has been the dispute on internal structural devolution, meaning if the central 
administrative bodies should be organized in the form of ministries or directorates 
(central agencies). How much autonomy directorates should have in relation to 
ministries has been a recurrent problem. Form the mid 1950s, a dominant 
WORKING PAPER  21  –  2003 THE  STRUCTURAL  ANATOMY OF  THE  NORWEGIAN  STATE   
 14
administrative doctrine was that the ministries should be relieved of routine tasks, which 
were administrative and technical in nature, and that these should then be transferred to 
subordinate directorates and agencies. Another important doctrine was that the 
ministries should be developed into secretariats for political leadership.  
From the early 1970s, there was a stronger focus on political decentralization to 
counties and municipalities at the expenses of the central agencies. A new political body 
at the regional level was established, and the policy programmes from the mid 1970s 
announced that tasks and responsibilities should be moved from ministries and central 
agencies to this political–administrative level. 
The 1970s was a period where importance was attached to increased transparency, 
participation and representation through the development of internal workplace 
democracy in public administration and by transferring tasks and responsibilities to a 
new regional level. The principle of free access to official records was introduced 
through the Freedom of Information Act in 1970. During this period, the aim was at 
political decentralization, rather than strengthening of the directorates. County and 
municipal authorities received responsibilities for a number of tasks, which were 
transferred from central government.   
Norway has a long tradition of a homogenous and parliamentary-based political 
leadership living in peaceful coexistence. The political leadership maintained a close 
connection with administrative leadership characterized by strong mutual trust. 
Traditionally, central political and administrative actors have agreed on balancing 
political considerations with the value of a rule-oriented civil service, citizen’s rights, 
transparency, equity, interest mediation and codes of professional behaviour. There has 
traditionally been a strong political control of public enterprises in Norway within a 
system of ministerial governance, and this went hand in hand with hiearchical structural 
features and an integrated administrative model. Up to the mid 1990s, Norway has 
tended to see public enterprises as a strong and integrated instrument of political 
development, organized as government administrative enterprises (Grønlie 1998).  
The Hermansen commission (1989) changed the focus from internal structural 
devolution and the relations between ministries and directorates to external structural 
devolution focusing on state-owned companies and governmental foundations. The 
commission discussed the coupling between tasks and organizational form, and 
suggested more active use of different standardized forms of state-owned companies. 
Governmental foundations were not recommended because of accountability and 
steering problems connected to this form of affiliation. 
In Norway, the control function was for a long time, particularly after World War II, 
general and passive, allowing the executive a lot of leeway in general decision making, 
and more specifically letting the organizing of central government be an executive 
prerogative (Christensen and Peters 1999, Roness 2001a, Smith 1997). This seems to 
reflect some major features of the political–administrative system: a high level of mutual 
trust between political and administrative leaders and within the public administration, 
strong egalitarian values and common attitudes and norms among politicians and civil 
servants, clear role allocation between the powers and delegation of authority from the 
legislature to the executive (Christensen and Peters 1999, Christensen and Lægreid 
2001a). 
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Norway has been characterized by a strong statist tradition, incremental changes, the 
balancing of many values in civil service and a policy style of peaceful coexistence and 
revolution in slow motion (Olsen, Roness and Sætren 1982). The relations between 
politicians and administrative leaders, and also within the public sector, have 
traditionally been one of cooperation and mutual understanding. Norway has thus a 
consensus-oriented political–administrative system. With its multi-party system and 
minority governments, it is generally characterized by negotiation and compromise in 
public policy-making processes. Adding to this, the civil service in Norway is, relatively 
speaking, more homogeneous in structure and personnel than the civil service in larger 
countries where the diversity is substantial on both counts.  
Norway has, since World War II, experienced many parliamentary constellations. 
From 1946 to 1961, the Labour Party had the majority and formed the cabinet alone. 
Although it lost the majority in 1961, it remained in power until 1965 (except for a short 
time in 1963). Then came a period of non-socialist majority government, while the last 
three decades have mainly seen minority governments, either non-socialist coalitions or 
the Labour Party alone. 
Considering that Norway belongs to a Scandinavian administrative tradition 
emphasizing the political–democratic context of the civil service, Weberian values, 
corporatism and equality, and a large universal welfare state, one may expect that the 
public administration will not adapt fully to NPM reforms. 
The modernization programmes from the mid 1980s emphasized that the public 
sector had to make better use of resources and increase efficiency. Proposals were made 
for less control and greater autonomy. However, the reform programmes were a 
collection of reform ideas rather than a consistent policy. Opposing objectives such as 
increased autonomy, discretion and flexibility on the one hand, and enhanced political 
and administrative control on the other, were hardly discussed. The programmes had 
initially a strong management approach using management-by-objectives-technique and 
structural devolution, and the slogan ‘letting the manager manage’ was popular. Later 
on, control components by the use of performance management have been emphasized 
more strongly, and the use of contracts, marketization and outsourcing has become a 
major strategy for the government of today. 
Discussion of NPM reforms began in Norway in the mid 1980s, but the Norwegian 
reform programmes then were more a loose collection of on-going reform measures 
and new reform ideas than a consistent, coordinated and unified strategic plan for 
changing the state apparatus (Lægreid and Roness 2003). The rhetoric in the 
modernization programmes reflected international trends in administrative policy, but it 
was not very specific concerning reform measures. The reform programmes promised 
better service, better utilization of resources, higher productivity, stronger attainment of 
goals, improved quality, better working conditions for employees, improved political 
control and extended user participation. Even though a vision of market- and 
management-based practices was presented in administrative policy documents, its 
implementation remained optional (Christensen and Lægreid 1998a, Naschold 1996: 66). 
The assumption was that the pursuit of economic performance should not affect 
negatively other values like democratic representation, a state based on the rule of law 
and professional quality. Concerns about the implications of the reforms for democracy 
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and inequality modified the reform efforts (Lægreid 2001a), but in practice there has 
been a change in the balance of different values in favour of efficiency.  
The reform programmes of various Norwegian governments thus exhibited more 
similarities than differences. They were pragmatic and cooperative rather than 
ideological and confrontational, and they were directed more at enhancing internal 
productivity and increasing efficiency than at rolling back the state. Reform strategies 
tended to be sector-based rather than comprehensive. The reform style up to the mid 
1990s was maintenance, adjustment and supplementation rather than radical change. 
Some elements, like the management components of NPM, have been implemented to 
a greater degree than the market elements (Christensen and Lægreid 1998a). 
The Norwegian adoption of NPM through an active administrative policy under the 
auspices of the executive has since the mid 1990s mainly taken the form of increased 
structural devolution and the introduction of Management-by-objectives-and-results 
(MBOR) (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a). MBOR entails more flexibility, leeway, 
autonomy and discretionary power for subordinate agencies. It is a form of procedural 
autonomization or devolution, implying that the formal organizational structure is 
stable, but the internal rules and procedures are more flexible, opening up for more 
leeway for agency managers. Both structural devolution and MBOR illustrate the hybrid 
character in NPM coming from the centralizing tendencies in contractualism and the 
decentralizing tendencies in managerialism. NPM is thus a double-edged sword 
prescribing centralization, regulation and control as well as decentralization, flexibility 
and autonomy. Units and tasks are moved to organizational forms that are further away 
from the political leadership, implying more freedom for devolved agencies and 
generally weaker potential for control and scrutiny by the government, but also the need 
for new forms of control and regulation by use of contract steering and performance 
budgeting (Christensen and Lægreid 2001b). The role of the ministries as secretariats for 
political leadership has been enhanced through this process.  
The Norwegian reform process has mainly been a combination of internal delegation 
of authority combined with a more formalized performance assessment regime and 
external structural devolution. Devolution can take many forms, but one main idea is to 
strengthen the discretionary power of managers and give subordinate levels of the 
administration, agencies and public enterprises more autonomy (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001b, Grønlie and Selle 1998, OECD 1996). Structural devolution entails a 
transfer of authority downwards in the hierarchy, either to lower-ranking units within 
existing organizations or to new subordinate governmental organizations, and implies 
increased vertical specialization (Christensen 2001). Many governments are moving 
units or tasks to organizational forms that are vertically further away from the central 
political leadership. Global pressure to cooperate and compete in new ways is pointing 
in the direction of more market competition and imperative change processes that a 
single country or administrative unit cannot easily cope with. This is a reflection also of 
the doctrine that politics and business should be separated and that private actors are 
better market actors than public ones. Hence, it is claimed that the most effective way of 
doing business for the public sector is either to create organizational forms that attend 
more systematically to commercial functions or to let private actors take over (Boston et 
al. 1996). 
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There are, however, important distinctions between the Norwegian reform 
programmes and the main trends in the international administrative policy reform 
movement (Olsen 1996). First, visions of the decline of the public sector through 
privatization scarcely featured in the Norwegian reform programmes (Christensen and 
Lægreid 1998a). Second, international criticism that the growth of powerful special 
interest organizations had prevented political institutions from addressing broader 
national concerns did not receive much support in Norway.  
A mixture of symbols and rhetoric, on the one hand, and pragmatic and instrumental 
measures, on the other, has characterized the reform programmes in Norway. The 
slogan of the government of today «From words to action» indicates a wish to weaken 
the symbolic elements of administrative reform and to enhance the substantive outcome 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2003a).  
The formal structural arrangements 
in the Norwegian state apparatus 
The existing forms of state organizations in Norway are outlined in Table 1, starting by 
those closest to the executive on the left and increasing degrees of structural devolution 
towards the right. 
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Table 1. Different forms of affiliation for units in the Norwegian state and the number of units in each 
category. 2003. 
Civil Service State-Owned Companies (SOC) 
Governmental 
foundations 
Ministries Directo-
rates, 
Central 
agencies4 
Other 
public 
admini-
stration 
bodies 
Central 
Agencies 
with 
extended 
authority 
Govern-
ment 
adminis-
trative 
enter-
prises 
Financial 
inst., 
funds 
Hybrid 
com-
panies 
estab-
lished by 
special 
laws 
Govern-
ment-
owned 
com-
panies 
Govern-
ment 
limited 
companies 
(100% 
state 
owned) 
Limited 
com-
panies 
with the 
state as 
majority 
owner 
Central 
found- 
ations 
Fringe 
found- 
ations 
185 62 90 21 5 5 9 6 28 19 52 26 
Example: 
Ministry 
of Health 
Example: 
Railway 
Inspecto-
rate 
Example: 
Norwegian 
Polar 
Institute 
Example: 
Research 
Council of 
Norway 
Example:
Norwe-
gian 
Mapping 
Authority 
Example: 
Norw. 
State 
Housing 
Bank 
Example:
Retail 
Monopoly 
of Wine 
and 
Spirits 
Example:
Norwe-
gian 
Power 
Company 
Example: 
Norwegian 
State 
Railways 
Example:
Statoil 
Example:
Museums 
Example: 
Telemark 
Research 
18 183 62 78 
 
The major formal dividing line, as shown in Table 1, runs between central administrative 
units, including government administrative enterprises, and state-owned companies 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2003b). There is also a significant difference between 
governmental foundations and SOCs. Central agencies and government administrative 
enterprises are units at sub-ministerial level and are, legally speaking, government 
entities subject to ministerial directions and directly subordinated to ministerial control. 
In contrast to state-owned companies, the state budget, the state collective wage 
agreement, the state pension scheme, the Freedom of Information Act, and the 
administrative law regulate the civil service.6 Government administrative enterprises are 
given enhanced budgetary leeway.  
 One can distinguish between internal structural devolution, whereby civil service 
organizations are converted from one sub-category into another, giving them more 
autonomy from the political leadership, and external structural devolution, whereby civil 
service organizations are converted into some sort of state-owned company or 
governmental foundation (Lægreid and Roness 1998). The main aim of this process is to 
distance the delivery and control of an activity or service from politicians and to secure 
commercial benefits and professional autonomy. This is done by transferring some 
                                                 
4 Including regulatory and scrutiny agencies for the SOCs.  
5 Including Prime Minister’s office 
6 See Appendix for a more detailed description 
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formal powers from the minister to a board or to the agency or company leader, where 
it can be exercised with a degree of autonomy from ministerial control, even though the 
responsible minister does not relinquish his or her authority entirely. Its ideological basis 
is a new and narrower view of the role of the state as a «supermarket state», where the 
primary emphasis is on the state as a regulator of market competition (Olsen 1988) 
rather than as a comprehensive, sovereign planning state. 
 The reforms of state-owned companies in Norway during the last decade have 
brought some substantial changes to the traditional structure. SOCs are primarily 
characterized by their independent legal status, by having their own control or scrutiny 
bodies, by holding responsibility for their own economic resources, and closely 
observing the laws regulating private companies (Zuna 2001). The government controls 
the SOCs through its ownership position, manifested in an annual general assembly and 
in some cases a continuous steering dialogue between the owner and the companies, but 
also through its role of regulator by laws and regulations. The companies' income comes 
from the market but also from the government, which pays the companies for non-
profitable social functions or simply transfers money to strengthen their economic basis. 
SOCs can handle their own income independently of economic decisions made in the 
Storting (Parliament). They can borrow money to finance their activities, and the 
responsibility of the government for the loans is limited. Government limited 
companies can, in principle, go bankrupt. The different forms of company affiliation are 
displayed in Table 1, with the structurally most devolved forms – in the sense of 
autonomy from guidelines and government steering – in the far right-hand column.  
Studies of how the different types of new SOCs work indicate that government 
control of these companies is seen as overly formal and relatively passive, and also that 
in practice they have many similar features, with little differentiation between them 
(Statskonsult 1998). There is no close match between the legal status and operational 
practice of each sub-category (Grønlie 1998, Wik 2001), which means that for analytical 
purposes we can treat them as one category of SOCs. A plausible conclusion from the 
existing studies is that while organizational form matters, it does not closely determine 
the pattern of control and autonomy. Even if the form of affiliation allows significant 
leeway for a trade-off between different objectives and values, it is fair to say that, 
generally speaking, the possibilities for political control decrease and the latitude for 
economic values and market considerations increases as we move towards the right of 
Table 1 (Wik 2001). The companies’ contacts with ministries drop when they are 
converted from government administrative enterprises into SOCs, and less weight than 
before is given to political signals and non-commercial activities (Christensen and 
Egeberg 1997). 
Governmental foundations are separate legal entities, founded either by a ministry 
(central foundations) or by an agency (fringe foundations). Like state-owned companies, 
they are not covered by the civil service rules and regulations like the state budget, 
financial management regulations, public personnel administration, the Civil Service 
Act, the Public Administration Act or the Freedom of Information Act. In contrast to 
state-owned companies they are self-owned entities, and thus have more formal 
autonomy from the ministry than SOCs. The government can control the foundations 
by general laws and regulations, by recruiting board members and by formulations of 
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statutes. These control devices are, however, weaker and less precise than for the others 
forms of affiliation. 
Changes in the formal structure of 
the state apparatus 
It is important to distinguish between administrative policy programmes, and the actual 
changes that are being undertaken. In this section we will concentrate on the changes in 
formal structure that actually have taken place, by focusing on the growth of 
administrative units and the horizontal and vertical specialization of the state apparatus. 
S ize  o f  the  s ta te  
The number of ministries, including the Prime Minister’s Office, in Norway has 
increased from 13 in 1947 to 18 in 2003, an increase of 38 %. The corresponding 
increase in the number of internal administrative units in ministries (divisions, sections 
etc) is 89%. Our focus in the presentation below is not the ministries and their internal 
administrative units, but affiliated units at one or more arms-lengths from ministries. 
The Norwegian State Administration Database (NSA) has a detailed categorization 
of different forms of affiliation (Rolland and Ågotnes 2003). Further in the presentation 
we will focus on three main forms of affiliation: civil service (excluding ministries), 
state-owned companies, and (governmental) central foundations (see Table 1). But we 
will also to some extent differentiate between the various sub-categories of civil service 
organizations and state-owned companies. 
It may be added that no subsidiary internal units are included, and public 
administration bodies having corresponding type of tasks are grouped together. This 
means that regional offices that are reporting to a national body are not counted, and 
bodies with corresponding type of tasks reporting directly to a ministry are grouped 
together and counted as one (for example state colleges). In the NSA, grouped bodies 
only appear in the sub-category «other public administration bodies». 
We will distinguish between four periods in the post World War II administrative 
history in Norway. First, the period from 1947 to 1969, representing the growth of the 
Norwegian welfare state. Second, the period from 1970 to 1983. The strong 
democratisation and political decentralization movement connected to the No-to-EEC 
referendum in 1972 represents the start of the period. The first conservative 
government in Norway for more than 50 years when the Willoch government came into 
office in 1981 represents the change to the third period, introducing the first New 
Public Management ideas of administrative reform. The last period starts in 1990 with 
the follow-up of the Hermansen commission and the Brundland government that came 
into office in 1991, and represents a gradually greater scope and intensity of the NPM-
reform movement. 
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Figure 2 reveals that there was a steady growth in civil service units (outside the 
ministries) up to the end of the second period. Then we see a significant decline in 
number of civil service units. 
Figure 2  Number of units within main forms of affiliation 1947–2003. 
 
From Figure 3 we see that the main decrease is in the sub-category «other public 
administration bodies», many of them being grouped bodies with corresponding type of 
tasks reporting directly to a ministry (e.g. state schools and research bodies). There has 
been a significant merging of these kinds of organizations into larger bodies over the 
past 15 years. Figure 3 also reveals that central agencies are not a new organizational 
form in Norway. Already in 1947 we had close to 50 central agencies. The number of 
central agencies was relatively stable up to 1960, representing the start of a 30-year 
steady but slow increase in the number of central agencies. In the last period there has 
been a weak decrease in the number of central agencies. The number of government 
administrative enterprises and central agencies with extended authority has been low, 
but over the past few years there has been an increase in the number of central agencies 
with extended authority.  
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Figure 3. Number of units within sub-categories of civil service organizations 1947–2003. 
   
In contrast to the number of civil service organizations, the number of state-owned 
companies and (governmental) central foundations has increased over time, and 
especially in the last period for SOCs and over the past two periods for foundations 
(Figure 2). The first wave of government limited companies was in the 1950s (Figure 4). 
After a short cutback period, the number increased from 1966 to 1986. Then the 
numbers of government limited companies decreased somewhat, mostly because of an 
increase in the number of partly privatized companies. In 1991, a new sub-category of 
SOCs was introduced:  government-owned companies. 
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 Figure 4 Number of units within sub-categories of state-owned companies 1947–2003 
 
In Figure 5 and Figure 6, the number of units within the main forms of affiliation is 
distributed on parent ministry, in 1948 and 2003 respectively. In 1948, the Ministry of 
Church Affairs and Education and the Ministry of Agriculture topped the list of civil 
service organizations. Most of the state-owned companies were subordinated the 
Ministry of Industry and Shipping, but also six other ministries had SOCs, e.g. the 
Ministry of Defence. Governmental foundations were mainly subordinated the Ministry 
of Church Affairs and Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
In 2003, the number of civil service organizations is highest in what are now the 
Ministry of Education and Research and the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, 
while the number of civil service organizations under the Ministry of Agriculture has 
decreased significantly. Figure 6 also shows that only 4 out of 17 ministries, including 
the Ministry of Defence, do not have SOC’s. The Ministry of Trade and Industry is the 
only ministry with more SOCs than civil service organizations. Governmental 
foundations are most common under the Ministry of Education and Research, but there 
are also quite a few under the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs and the Ministry 
of the Environment. In the last ministerial area, there are more (governmental) central 
foundations than civil service organizations. 
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Figure 5 Number of units within main forms of affiliation in various ministries. 1948. 
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Figure 6. Number of units within main forms of affiliation in various ministries. 2003.  
Organ iza t iona l  change o f  the  s ta te   
In the NSA, 23 different exactly defined codes are used to describe organisational 
change. They are divided into three main groups: founding of organizations (6 codes), 
organizational maintenance (11 codes) and termination of organizations (6 codes). 
As seen in Figure 2, the number of units changes significantly from one year to 
another. These changes are documented through founding and termination change 
codes in the NSA. When we break the frequencies of units on (main) form of affiliation, 
we have to include organizational maintenance change codes that document movement 
of units in and out of the different (main) forms of affiliation.7 
In Table 2, organisational changes that influence the number of units between 
periods for our three main forms of affiliation are summarised. We have two types of 
foundings and terminations: Pure foundings are (by definition) new organizations with 
no prior history, while foundings based on existing units are organizations that are being 
                                                 
7 The parallel is the simple population model: If you have a population in a country on two different times, the 
change in numbers is caused by births, deaths, emigration and immigration. The change in number of units within 
civil service between two years are caused by the number of foundings, terminations, (existing) units that have 
changed their form of affiliation to civil service (immigration) and civil service organizations that have changed to 
other forms of affiliation (emigration). 
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created on the basis of one or more existing organizations. Similarly, pure terminations 
are (by definition) organizations where the tasks of the unit are not continued in other 
units, while termination into existing units are organizations where tasks continue in one 
ore more existing units. A more detailed presentation and discussion of the 
organizational change codes are provided in the documentation of the NSA (cf. also 
Rolland and Ågotnes 2003). 
Table 2 Organizational changes influencing the number of units. 1948 – 2003. 
Affiliation Period 
Number 
at the 
start of 
the 
period 
Pure 
found-
ings 
Found-
ings 
based on 
existing 
units 
Immi-
gration 
Emi-
gration8 
Pure 
termi-
nations 
Termi-
niations 
into 
existing 
units  
Number 
at the 
end of 
the 
period 
  = + + + - - - = 
1948–1970 13 3 0 0 0 0 1 15 
1970–1983 15 1 3 0 0 0 2 17 
1983–1990 17 1 4 0 0 0 5 17 
Ministries 
1990–2003 17 5 5 0 0 2 7 18 
1948–1970 227 119 15 9 15 21 54 280 
1970–1983 280 62 16 7 16 7 33 309 
1983–1990 309 20 16 4 25 12 29 283 
Civil service 
 
1990–2003 283 41 38 4 37 14 132 183 
1948–1970 21 9 4 6 3 4 5 28 
1970–1983 28 8 1 8 2 0 3 40 
1983–1990 40 4 3 2 5 2 2 40 
State-owned 
companies 
 
1990–2003 40 9 25 12 20 6 14 62 
1948–1970 7 10 0 1 0 0 1 17 
1970–1983 17 9 0 0 0 0 0 26 
1983–1990 26 10 0 6 1 0 2 39 
Governmental 
(central) 
foundations 
 
1990–2003 39 14 1 2 1 1 2 52 
 
                                                 
8 This category also covers units that have become subsidiary units in a larger civil service organization, and therefore 
not counted as a separate organization any longer. In the 1990–2003 period, this applies for 17 organizations, 
explaining the difference between the number of emigrations from civil service in Table 2 and Figure 7. 
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Table 2 shows that the main reason for the decrease in the number of civil service 
organizations (outside the ministries) from 1990 onwards is merger with other civil 
service organizations identified as terminations into existing units. This represents a 
horizontal de-specialization process. Table 2 also reveals that behind the relative stable 
number of ministries at the end of each period, there has been significant turbulence 
involving different kinds of foundings and terminations of ministries, especially in the 
1990s. The growth in the number of state-owned companies in the last period (from 40 
to 62) is mainly a result of foundings based on existing units, but there is also quite a 
few pure foundings and immigration of units from other forms of affiliation. The 
growth of the number of (governmental) central foundations is mainly due to pure 
foundings. 
V e r t i c a l  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  
Historically, the bulk of government administrative enterprises was organizationally 
close to political and administrative leadership and had little autonomy but direct access 
to the leadership. They were defined as part of the central public administration, 
signaling that political control  was more important than commercial values.  
During the last 15 years, about 50 state organizations have changed their form of 
affiliation in the direction of more devolved forms, which accounts for new forms of 
affiliation with more market competition and commercial freedom and less political 
control. This number includes external structural devolution from civil service to state-
owned companies as well as conversions of SOCs from one type into another more 
devolved form (for example from hybrid companies established by special laws to 
government limited companies, or from government limited companies to partly 
privatized limited companies), and internal structural devolution from ministry to 
central agencies or from central agencies to central agencies with extended authority or 
government administrative enterprises (Christensen and Lægreid 2001b). Until 1992, 
major public activities like railways, telecommunication, power, postal services, forestry, 
grain sales, public broadcasting, public road construction and airport administration 
were organized as central agencies or government administrative enterprises. Since then, 
the commercial parts of these enterprises have been corporatized, meaning established 
as different types of state-owned companies, while the regulatory parts have retained the 
central agency form. Adding to this, in 2002 all public hospitals changed their form of 
affiliation from (mainly) public administration bodies at the county level to state health 
enterprises. As a result, more autonomous regulatory and controlling agencies have been 
established (Rubecksen 2003). In several areas, the single purpose organization model 
has replaced the old integrated civil service model where the roles as owner, regulator, 
controller, purchaser and provider were conducted within the same organization. Still, 
there has been reluctance to privatize, although Norway has experienced some recent 
breakthroughs. For Telenor, the national telephone company, the state sold 17% of its 
shares to private investors in 2000, and Statoil, the large public oil company, is also 
partly privatized as of 2001. Telenor is an example of a company that has gone all the 
way from an integrated public enterprise to a partly privatized limited company (2000) 
with the interim status of a government limited company (1994). According to the 
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company statutes, Telenor and Norway Post were still limited by regional considerations 
after they changed their form of affiliation, and the public broadcasting still has 
educational and cultural obligations (Zuna 2001).  
Figure 7 shows the vertical specialization as seen from the Civil Service for the last 
period, 1990–2003. Vertical specialization, or autonomization, can be either internal 
within the public administration, i.e. from ministries to civil service; or external, from 
civil service to state-owned companies or to governmental foundations. Figure 7 reveals 
that in this period four units have moved from ministries to civil service, eight units 
have moved from civil service to state-owned companies and two have moved to 
governmental foundations. Four civil service units have been privatized, five have 
moved to the county level and one to the municipal level. There have been no moves in 
the opposite direction, towards politization or vertical de-specialization.9 
Figure 7. Vertical specialization. Central node: Civil Service. Number of units 1990 – 2003 
 
  
                                                 
9 The total movement out of the civil service in this period is 20. In addition, 17 units have become part of a larger 
civil service organization (cf. note 7). 
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Figure 8 Vertical specialization and de-specialization from civil service. Average number of units per 
year 1947 – 2003 
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Figure 8 shows the average number of units that have moved out of the civil service 
(outside the ministries) vertically per year in the different periods. The figure reveals, 
first, that stability characterizes the first period. Second, we see that regionalization is 
dominating in the second period, but the extent of regionalization is even stronger in 
the 1980s. Third, the figure shows that vertical de-specialization through 
autonomization is very strong in the third period and also relatively strong in the 1990s. 
Fourth, we see that privatization of civil service organizations is not occurring before 
the third period, but this trend is increasing in the last period.10 Finally, vertical de-
specialization or politization is rather uncommon, and only occurring to some extent in 
the first and third period. 
H o r i z o n t a l  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  
In contrast to vertical specialization and de-specialization, horizontal specialization and 
de-specialization occur within the same form of affiliation. We define horizontal 
specialization as pure foundings, new by secession and new by dividing. Horizontal de-
                                                 
10 If we include state-owned companies the number of privatized organizations increases. For example, 12 state-
owned companies were privatized in the last period. 
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specialization is defined as pure terminations, terminations by absorption and 
terminations by merging. 
From Figure 9 we can see that specialization was the main trend in the civil service 
(outside the ministries) in the first two periods. In the third period, there is a balance 
between specialization and de-specialization. From 1990, the picture is dominated by 
horizontal de-specialization. This means that there now is a significant amount of 
amalgamation and merging processes going on within the civil service. This trend is also 
evident if we only look at the central agencies. The figure also reveals that in all periods 
there are parallel processes of horizontal specialization and de-specialization. Horizontal 
specialization and de-specialization are also more common than vertical specialization 
and de-specialization. By comparing Figure 8 and Figure 9 we see that the different 
forms of vertical specialization involve on average about one unit per year, while 
horizontal specialization and de-specialization involve between 3 and 6 units annually.  
Figure 9 Horizontal specialization and de-specialization within the civil service. Average number of 
units per year, 1948 – 2003. 
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Vertical specialization or autonomization is not a new reform strategy in Norway, but its 
content has changed over time. The first systematic wave of government limited 
companies came in the period 1945–1963 (Grønlie 1998). Norway has a long history of 
large public enterprises, primarily state-owned companies (SOCs) in industry and central 
administrative enterprises in the communications sectors. These enterprises traditionally 
had close ties with the Labour Party and its strategy of controlling vital economic 
sectors, creating employment and building up the welfare state through economic 
growth. Traditionally, the political leadership had a hands-on relationship with 
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establishing these enterprises and installed directors as industry-builders. Historically, 
the bulk of public enterprises was organizationally close to the political and 
administrative leadership and had little autonomy but direct access to the leadership. 
The traditional SOCs had, however, great corporate autonomy (Grønlie 1998). They 
were owned by or subordinated to the ministry responsible for the sector in which they 
operate. This sectional specialization may make it easier to take sector policy concerns 
into account. 
A second wave of structural devolution began in the mid 1980s and gained particular 
momentum from the mid 1990s onwards, increasing in both speed and scope. In 
contrast to the first period where the main strategy was to build up new SOCs, the 
second period was characterized by changing the form of affiliation of established 
public enterprises. The dominant administrative doctrine of traditional integrated 
organizational forms under strong political control was replaced by one of greater 
fragmentation, reflecting the increased influence of NPM. Corporatization of public 
enterprises did not come about as a result of a comprehensive plan and an isolated 
initiative, but happened incrementally and was coupled to changes in sectoral politics 
(Zuna 2001). The main arguments for changing the form of affiliation have been 
technological development, internationalization and demonopolization. Adding to this, 
over the past few years several SOCs have been transferred to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. This ministry is now in the process of becoming a more specializad ownership 
ministry. 
Some of the enterprises whose status has changed are quite large – e.g. the national 
telecommunications company (Telenor), the postal service and the state railways. Thus, 
the devolution process has reduced the number of full time employees in the civil 
service from 167.586 in 1990 to 118.643 in 2002 (St.prp. no.1 (2002–2003)). The 
process speeded up after the telecommunications monopoly changed its form of 
affiliation from that of an integrated governmental administrative enterprise to a 100% 
state-owned limited company, following an intense public debate and political dispute, 
especially with the state employees’ unions, in 1994. Even though some monopolies are 
still held, the conversion has been accompanied by increasing exposure to competition. 
Part of this deregulation is a result of pressure originating from Norway’s associated 
membership in the European Union through the European Economic Area agreement 
(EEA), which gives it access to the EU internal market (Bræin 1999, Moen 1998).  
The main reform strategy in Norway has been to avoid privatization by 
concentrating on structural devolution within the public sector. As recently as 1996, 
only 7% of civil servants in ministries and central agencies reported that privatization 
was a reform measure with high significance in their own field of work, and fewer that 
5% saw privatization as a reform which should be given higher priority (Christensen and 
Lægreid 1998a, 1999). Unlike in many other countries, there are few examples of 
privatization in Norway, but rather a combination of internal delegation of authority and 
external structural devolution (Lægreid and Roness 1998). As we see from Figure 8, 
privatization is becoming more common over the past years.  
Summing up, first, it has to be emphasised that reforms and change are no new 
phenomena in the Norwegian state apparatus. Reforms are very much a routine activity. 
It is a myth that state administration is cumbersome, stiff and hardly capable of change. 
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On the contrary, change is a more manifest characteristic than stability. Reform is not 
something that arose with the modernization and renewal programmes in the mid 1980s 
(Grønlie 1998, Lægreid 2001b, Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). 
Second, the change processes in the civil service have altered from growth in number 
of units in the first two periods to rearrangements and decrease in number of units over 
the last two periods. The number of organizations in the civil service peaked in 1983 
with 309 units. Twenty years later the number was 183. 
Third, we have revealed that there is an increasingly parallel process of vertical 
specialization and horizontal de-specialization over the past two periods. Units are 
changing their form of affiliation through structural devolution or autonomization at the 
same time as units within the same form of affiliation are going through amalgamation 
and merging processes and are being terminated into existing units to an increasing 
degree. The merging processes might be seen as a Norwegian way of handling the 
challenge of weak horizontal coordination in a fragmented state. This process of 
horizontal de-specialization is especially occurring among civil service organizations not 
being central agencies, governmental administrative enterprises or central agencies with 
extended authorities. The College Reform of 1994 resulting in changing 98 regional 
colleges into 26 state colleges is an example of this kind of merger. 
Fourth, we can conclude that administrative reforms are not merely empty talk. 
Public administration in Norway has been subjected to considerable reform demands, 
and significant changes have also occurred in their organizational structure. The many 
reform programmes that took place after the early 1980s have shown that it is possible 
to change the structure of state administration through planned reform strategies. From 
the end of the 1980s administrative changes have taken on a new character from change 
through construction to change through reconstruction (Lægreid and Pedersen 1999, 
Hodnefjell 2001). 
Fifth, historical ties, traditions and established routines, which characterize the 
Norwegian state, influence the changes that are occurring today. Current reforms are to 
a large extent reactions to, or consequences of, earlier reforms, implying that reforms 
generate new reforms. The historical legacy of a governmental model with ministerial 
rule clearly affects changes in the formal organizational structure in central government 
in Norway. The existence of strong sector ministries and a weak administrative ministry 
with weak horizontal coordinative power means that the reform processes are more 
often driven through sector-specific initiatives than through comprehensive general 
reform programmes from the government. The result is significant variations in reform 
intensity and scopes from one sector ministry to another (Lovik 1997, Mathisen 1998). 
Sixth, the changes in the Norwegian state apparatus have been influenced by the 
diffusion of administrative policy doctrines, problem recognition and proposals for 
solution extending across national boundaries. What may be considered as a good 
administrative solution in those countries with which an affinity is felt, may to some 
extent be adopted. Reform is characterized by an apolitical rhetoric: policy 
entrepreneurship for administrative reforms has been more common among 
administrative leaders than among political leaders, at least up to the end of the 1990s 
(Lægreid and Roness 1998). Reform has taken scant consideration of the fact that it is a 
democratic governance system that is the object of the reform. Questions of internal 
THE STRUCTURAL  ANATOMY OF  THE  NORWEGIAN  STATE WORKING PAPER  21  -  2003  
  33
efficiency have become more central issues than consideration of democratic values. In 
line with the NPM movement, management problems have essentially been discussed as 
a question of cost efficiency, while the need for better political control has been less 
focused. 
The seventh point that needs to be made is that the development of administration 
has not been straightforward, clear and uniform, but characterized by an increasing 
complexity of goals and means. Adding to this there is an unstable balance between 
political control and agency autonomy, implying dilemmas and challenges for political 
executives (Christensen and Lægreid 2002, 2003c, 2003d). By means of expansion, 
differentiation and increased autonomy, the state has become an increasingly complex 
organisation (cf. Premfors 1998). Renewed focus on considerations such as efficiency 
do not replace the existing values such as  equity, but come in addition and supplant 
previously important considerations. A fragmented, complex and segmented public 
administration has created an administrative policy and administrative changes with 
corresponding characteristics. 
One important lesson of the reforms in Norway is that the coupling of visions, 
reform measures and the actual changes occurring is not always very tight (Lægreid and 
Roness 1999, 2003). This can be illustrated by the fact that the number of central 
agencies did not decrease in the 1970 in spite of the policy signals of political 
decentralization. And in contrast to the policy signals from the Hermansen commission 
in 1989, the number of (governmental) central foundations continued to increase 
throughout the 1990s. It is important to distinguish between general administrative 
policy documents, specific reform measures and actual changes, and between reform 
and change (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). Not all administrative changes are the result of 
reforms, and not all reforms result in manifest changes. It is important to distinguish 
between general administrative policy documents, specific reform measures and actual 
changes. There have been many changes in visions and structural features. Nevertheless, 
over time, links between the overarching and the sector-based reform requirements 
have been strengthened. An example of this is the increased focus on autonomization, 
corporatization and market solutions both in the reform programmes of today and in 
the actual changes in public sector organizations over the last years. 
Conclusion 
Our conclusion is that there is no one-factor explaining change in administrative 
structures in public sector organizations. To understand the change processes we will 
argue for the usefulness of a transformative approach that blend explanatory factors 
from the domestic administrative history and polity structure, strategic choices made 
through an active administrative policy, and external pressure from administrative 
doctrines dominating internationally.  
In the international discussion on administrative reforms, three distinct 
interpretations may be found (Premfors 1998). The first is represented in the new 
universal, administrative orthodoxy (March and Olsen 1983), similar to that first and 
foremost advanced through the OECD and expressed in the doctrines of New Public 
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Management. The main components are more market and management orientation, 
privatization, efficiency and the introduction of private sector management principles 
into the public sphere. The main argument in this version is that the crisis of the welfare 
state in the 1970s demanded a necessary adjustment to a market- and management-
oriented state, that those countries who had essentially gone in the direction of NPM 
represent economic success stories, and that there is a globalization movement in 
process and the convergence of different nations. 
The second interpretation regards administrative reforms first and foremost as 
symbolic reactions to expectations of the setting (Brunsson and Olsen 1993, Røvik 
1996). To the extent that the public sector has been changed at all, this is the 
consequence of the desire to present itself as the modern state. Planned reforms do not 
necessarily result in concrete changes in core activities. The association between the talk 
of reform and the practical consequences of such reforms is relatively loose. Here, also, 
there is a tendency towards convergence or isomorphism, which among other things is 
the result of the reform ideas being effectively disseminated through organizations such 
as the OECD (Lerdell and Sahlin-Andersson 1997). 
The third interpretation casts some doubt over how far the convergence process has 
proceeded and attaches weight to the reform being influenced by characteristic national 
traditions, historical context and organization-specific traditions. Differentiation 
between the various reform processes in different countries is emphasized, and the 
variation regarding reform ideas, reform measures as well as reform effects are stressed.  
Our findings seem to support the last interpretation. The state apparatus in Norway 
is in some ways affected by NPM-related reform elements. But our data yield few 
indications that an international profile is resulting in NPM attaining dominant stature in 
Norway. The practical accomplishment of reforms in Norway can hardly be seen as a 
general acceptance of the universal reform wave based on NPM doctrines. 
Administrative reforms in Norway have largely proceeded with the support of the state 
employees’ unions (Roness 2001b). A modification of the OECD version of NPM has 
thus occurred so that it now conforms more closely to the Scandinavian consensus 
tradition, something that can be seen as a transformation feature. We are confronted 
with a Norwegian version of public sector reform where NPM seems to supplement 
established procedures and working methods more so than replacing them. The state 
organization in Norway seems to have adjusted to the new administrative reforms in a 
pragmatic, incremental and cautious manner but also within a strong tradition of 
problem solving through foundings of new public sector units and the reorganization of 
established units, and a quicker pace in the reform efforts during the last five years. 
Adding to this, in Norway the agencification process has a much longer history than 
NPM. 
New administrative policy procedures and measures are not opposed altogether, but 
some of them are incorporated into established administrative practice. The 
administrative reforms undergo a screening process whereby they are filtered and 
refined (Røvik 1996, 1998, Sahlin-Andersson 1996). Established structural arrangements 
do not disappear, but are gradually modified by the reforms. Norwegian civil service has 
opened the door for certain parts of NPM, but at the same time the individual agencies 
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have their own «gate-keepers» who transform, interpret and give meaning to the new 
administrative policy (Christensen and Lægreid 1998b). 
Our interpretation is that the Norwegian state apparatus is resistant to radical change, 
while simultaneously being loyal to administrative policy reform measures. The new 
administrative reform measures are not wholly rejected, but are adapted to the 
established culture and those procedures and working routines that exist in the 
ministries. The international concept of administrative reform and guidelines for good 
organization that come through the NPM doctrines are «edited», implying that the 
reforms are adapted and modified. The introduction of NPM into Norwegian central 
government corresponds to a transformative view on administrative change as reform 
processes that are a complex interplay between international trends, particular national 
structures, historical–cultural contexts and specific organizational traditions. It is not a 
simple and automatic adjustment to current international administrative doctrines that 
occurs. The measures are adjusted and interpreted based on national culture and 
tradition, but political initiatives appropriate to the particular situation of the individual 
country are also important. In other words, contexts matter and there is no «best 
practice» for reform of the public sector and which may easily be transferred from one 
country to the next. 
An active administrative policy assumes that alternative forms of organization already 
exist or may be established, that the political leadership can choose the form of 
organization to be used, that they have control over the implementation, that different 
forms of organization will have different effects, and that there are clear criteria for 
evaluating the effects (Lægreid 1990, Olsen 1990). All these assumptions are 
problematic. Administrative reforms are frequently characterized by an absence of 
clearly specified goals, that an understanding of the relationship between goals and 
means is imprecise, that the political leadership can not choose freely the type of reform 
measure to be implemented, and that the control over the implementation of the 
reforms is difficult (Christensen and Lægreid 1998b, Christensen, Lægreid and Wise 
2002). 
Corresponding to the established political–administrative structure in Norway, the 
concrete reform measures can be interpreted as a political cooperation process where, with a 
starting point in established relationships based on trust, an approach is made to those 
solutions which are administratively and politically reasonable and possible in the light 
of opposing views and demands (Olsen 1989). The administrative policy reform style is 
scarcely distinguished from that of the decision-making processes that have 
characterized Norwegian politics in the post-war period and which have been called 
peaceful coexistence and revolution in slow motion based on common interests rather 
than a situation of clear winners and losers (Olsen, Roness and Sætren 1982). Under 
such conditions, successful reform will be more a question of keeping the reform 
process alive long enough such that the many small measures can be aggregated into a 
more comprehensive adjustment of the state apparatus. This paper has shown that there 
are a number of large internal variations in the state administration resulting from a 
hierarchical structure and specialization of functions. This suggests a need for increased 
pluralism regarding administrative policy measures, and that standardization based on a 
single management ideal, has clear limitations. Administrative policy is not only a 
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question of effective implementation of central measures at the individual organizations, 
but also the extent to which the responses in individual organizations feed back and 
influence the overall administrative policy. This implies that it is important to study 
administrative policy bottom-up, i.e. how management and organization in practice is 
changed within the various parts of central government (Jacobsson 1995). 
The challenge is to determine the extent of the negotiating space required for an 
active administrative policy in a situation characterized by demands for adjustment to a 
dominant administrative policy fashioned from abroad, and of demands for adaptation 
to an established administrative culture and historical legacies of national styles of 
governance. 
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Appendix :  
The SOCs in Norway can be divided into four types:  
 
1)Hybrid companies established by special laws. This is a company form 
established on the basis of specific legislation or a specific statute. These companies 
have a more general profile concerning societal considerations than public corporations. 
2) Government owned companies with a more sectoral profile. This organizational 
form was established in 1992 and is supposed to take sectoral policy objectives into 
account.  
3) Government limited companies owned 100% by the government. This is the 
most common form for state-owned companies. It has historically been used for 
industry and construction, including sectors like the defense industry, iron mills, 
aluminium, mining and energy. In contrast to most SOCs, government limited 
companies are not monopolies and operate under market competition. 
4) Limited companies with the state as majority owner. In this category are 
companies where the government owns a majority of the shares. These companies are 
normally stock companies. During the current reform period there has been a tendency 
to sell shares to private actors in some of the large SOCs or decrease the majority 
position to a minority one in some partly privatized companies. One of Norway’s largest 
companies, Norsk Hydro, is in this category; and in 2000 Telenor became partly 
privatized when the government sold 17% of its shares to private interests. In 2001 
Statoil also went on the stock exchange and became a partly privatized company, with a 
minority of its shares sold to private investors. 
Added to this rather complex set of organizational forms is an increasing tendency to 
establish different forms of subsidiary companies. This is most common in the state-
owned companies. They are usually 100 % owned by the state-owned companies, but 
there are also quite a few examples of subsidiary companies where the parent company 
has a majority, or even a minority, of the shares. For instance, in 2000 Norway Post had 
27 subsidiary companies and the Norwegian Power Company had 13. Telenor had 49 
subsidiary companies and 130 subsidiary companies owned by subsidiary companies in 
1999. Even government administrative enterprises, like the Norwegian National Rail 
Administration, have established several subsidiary companies. Subsidiary companies are 
not included in the Norwegian State Administration Database (NSA). 
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